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Taxation and Customs Reforms in Fragile States: Between Bargaining and 
Enforcement 
 





This paper explores why taxation reforms are so different in fragile states, the conditions in 
which they occur, and what can be done to make these reforms more successful – including 
contributing, whenever possible, to state-building. Based on extensive engagement and 
fieldwork in the Sahel and other regions in sub-Saharan Africa (including Central and West 
Africa, and Somalia), this multidisciplinary paper builds on findings regarding taxation history 
in Africa, as well as existing research in anthropology and political economy. The paper 
explains why several prerequisites, such as state legitimacy or a centralised taxation power, 
are not present in most countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence (FCV), and, thus, 
why in many cases enforcement is impossible. It also explores the continuity between the 
institutions of colonial administrations and current tax and customs administrations, including 
why major changes cannot be expected in a short period of time. The level of taxation in FCV 
countries is mainly the result of bargaining processes between powerful actors.  
 
Keywords: customs; taxation; fragile and conflict-affected states; state legitimacy; informal 
trade; historical continuity. 
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1  Introduction, and what is at stake? 
 
In the last decade, African authorities and the international community have called for 
support to increase taxation capacity in order to reduce reliance on aid flows. This 
commitment to support tax administrations was reflected in the 2015 Addis Tax Initiative 
(ATI), which advocated ‘to double assistance to developing countries in order to strengthen 
their tax systems and administrations’ by the year 2020 (IMF 2017: 6). Increasing domestic 
resource mobilisation is even more salient for state-building in fragile states, in terms of 
providing costly services to citizens, including security, across national territory. There is a 
rich literature (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Besley and Persson 2009) arguing that robust 
and inclusive fiscal institutions are essential for state-building and economic growth. This is 
not the situation in fragile states. 
 
Despite the critical importance of taxation and revenue collection for fragile states, it has 
been particularly challenging to record sustainable progress given the functioning of those 
states, economies and societies. The impact of taxation reforms in fragile states has been 
particularly disappointing in recent decades. The ratio of domestic revenue to gross domestic 
product is lower in FCV countries than in other developing countries (Akitoby et al. 2020; Isar 
2020). Moreover, tax reforms in FCV countries have a higher likelihood of failing, and also 
lack sustainability (Drummond et al. 2012). Even if revenue collection rebounds after a 
conflict, it is usually insufficient to offset the initial decline. Finally, taxation is rarely 
considered a major factor in crisis prevention or in post-crisis situations, although it can play 
a role in both contexts.  
 
This paper explores why taxation reforms are so different in FCV countries, the conditions in 
which they occur, and what can be done to make these reforms more successful – including 
contributing, whenever possible, to state-building. 
 
There are case studies on some countries, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
papers on Somalia (Kalyundu and Norregaard 2020), and some papers focusing on technical 
aspects of taxation in fragile states (IMF 2017). However, to our knowledge, there are very 
few papers on taxation in fragile states combining technical, historical and political economy 
aspects – one of the few exceptions being Fjeldstad et al. (2018).  
 
To fill this gap, this paper aims to demonstrate the benefits of a multidisciplinary approach for 
tackling taxation reforms, combining findings from anthropology, history and political 
economy.  
 
The paper synthesises key ideas and arguments based on many years of experience and 
policy engagement in this area in the Sahel and other sub-Saharan African regions since 
2016 – including in regions where the state’s presence is challenged by armed groups, 
particularly Somalia and the Sahel.1  
 
The paper also explores the role of historical continuity between the institutional set-up of 
colonial administrations, and current tax and customs administrations. All tax and customs 
administrations, including those of fragile states, now share the same conceptual and 
technical framework, due to common global norms developed by international organisations.2 
 
1  e.g. the state presence is challenged by armed groups in the following countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Iraq, Libya, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan, as well as Syria, Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) and Yemen. 
2  International organisations having an impact on taxation norms include the World Customs Organization (WCO), the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The 





The progressive standardised approach since the 1950s tends to blur the long-term historical 
process of state-building, and the role of taxation in it. In addition, studies on taxation in 
developing countries assume a sharp break between colonial and post-colonial periods, and 
rarely address historical continuity (Andersson 2015). However, there is no historical break in 
the institutions of taxation, even for countries that were colonised. In China, for example, Jin 
(2018) shows that the colonial past of customs administrations had a long-term impact on 
local economic development. Understanding historical continuity is critical for raising 
awareness of why major changes cannot realistically be expected in a short period of time.  
 
This paper advocates taking politics more into account with taxation reforms. The level of 
taxation is mainly the result of bargaining processes between powerful actors.3 Reforming 
taxation in such contexts, therefore, assumes two shifts in the ideological status of the state 
when its legitimacy is at stake. First, taxes should be considered as instruments of social 
change, and tax options should be primarily evaluated in terms of their likely political impact, 
including the circulation of wealth within society (Fairfield 2015). This approach differs from 
the quantitative approach to taxation, which would favour tax measures in developing 
countries that generate the most revenue.4 Second, if the state should be rebuilt or 
consolidated, it must be recognised that the state is first and foremost coercive by nature. 
Putting the political economy of taxes back at the heart of taxation in fragile states assumes 
that the state is a coercive power, and that negotiation of taxes is a power relationship. 
Therefore, political economy considerations are crucial, and need to be included in the 
design of any taxation reform.  
 
The common model for taxation is built on three critical tenets that are not always explicit:  
 
• general acceptance of taxation coupled with strong state legitimacy (with a subsequent 
tax base);  
• a largely centralised and transparent revenue collection; and  
• a system of formalised revenue collection. 
 
In developing countries, where taxation systems are less efficient, this agreement takes a 
‘reciprocalist’ 5 form that is explicitly summarised in the 2015 ATI: taxes – domestic resource 
mobilisation – should fuel economic development. Reciprocity, a major source of trust (Levi 
2003), is considered crucial to reinforce government accountability vis-à-vis citizens (OECD 
2014). As a fiscal contract between the people and the state, it should reduce corruption, 
and, theoretically, generate a virtuous tax bargaining process (Brautigam et al. 2008). In FCV 
countries, where the state has partially lost its monopoly on the means of violence, the 
reciprocity of the fiscal contract is usually considered critical (Mansour and Schneider 2019).  
 
Deriving from such a model, the usual objectives for low-income countries are to:  
 
• broaden the tax base, mainly by formalising the informal sector, which leads to the 
‘registration obsession’ (Moore 2020); 
• move from trade taxes to domestic resources, that is, the ‘tax transition’ concept that 
consists of limiting tariffs and duties, strengthening trade facilitation measures and 
developing internal tax collection, including VAT (Chambas 2005); 
 
Although the domain of internal taxation is less normative, ‘global’ tools like the Tax Administration Diagnostic 
Assessment Tool (TADAT) are widely used by international organisations to assess tax systems in developing 
countries.  
3  It concurs with Prichard’s (2019) assessment that taxation is ‘fundamentally political’. 
4  The efficiency of militant groups in enforcing collection of revenue is sometimes highlighted by donor representatives, 
and shows how revenue collection may become an end in itself - no matter how or by whom it is generated. 





• facilitate payment by taxpayers, particularly larger ones, by developing large taxpayer 
units (Vehorn 2011; Macedo 2011). 
 
The scope of this paper has two limitations. First, it addresses taxation in the context of 
fragility, not necessarily in FCV countries as listed by international organisations. Although 
the definition of fragility remains contested to some degree, it has moved from a rather 
narrow and technical definition,6 to a more discrete and multidimensional approach that 
better takes into consideration fragility in middle-income countries, the conflict intensity 
dimension, and spatial dynamics.7 Using the most recent classification of fragility and conflict 
situations for World Bank Group engagement, we focus on countries or areas with high-
intensity conflicts8 and medium-intensity conflicts.9 Our focus is rather similar to that of 
Fjeldstad et al. (2018: 11), as it involves the same set of countries: ‘fragile states are, […], 
states whose monopoly on violence is either undermined or at considerable risk of being 
undermined’. More concretely, it means that in those countries, at local level, outside the 
national and regional capitals, civil servants (including police, customs officers and tax 
collectors) find it difficult to operate normally. The geographical limitation of fragility, including 
within the national territory, is important – as demonstrated by the collapse of the Malian 
state in 2013 due to a ‘fragile’ northern region. 
 
Second, the technical recommendations mainly focus on customs administrations, because 
customs are, de facto, the key player in state (re)building in fragile contexts. With the 
emergence of the concept of fiscal transition, and free trade agreements between African 
countries and the United States (US) and European Union (EU), the role of customs 
administrations in revenue collection was expected to decrease and slowly disappear. 
However, customs have remained central to taxation in FCV countries, and this is now widely 
acknowledged (IMF 2017). Indeed, goods are essentially easier to tax than people.10  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 highlights why the main tenets of tax and 
customs are not largely applicable to most FCV countries. It addresses the extent to which 
this model is impacted by the weak legitimacy of the state, insecurity and fragility, as well as 
the weight of historical continuity. Section 3 describes the conditions under which taxation 
and state-building can be reconciled to improve revenue collection, highlighting the role of 
customs, and questioning the impact of local revenue collection on social contracts. Section 
4 proposes some policy recommendations, taking into consideration the political economy 





6  This definition relies on a combination of a low Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating (as a proxy for 
poor governance) and the existence of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions. 
7  The causes and effects of fragility can be very different, such as between Zimbabwe and Somalia. Fragility may also be 
intra-state (Kenya, Nigeria) or country-wide. 
8  High-intensity conflict countries include Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, the 
Syrian Arab Republic, and the Republic of Yemen.  
9  Medium-intensity conflict countries include Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Sudan. 





2  Why taxation in FCV countries departs from 
the traditional model of taxation11  
 
There is a common assumption that a modern taxation system relies on a social contract of 
taxes in exchange of services provided by the state, and a political process of negotiation 
between the rulers and the people (Tilly 2009). This model is mostly inspired by Western 
fiscal state-building, and is technically driven by a reciprocalist approach that does not fit well 
within the context of fragility. 
 
State legitimacy, or a centralised taxation power, are not present in most FCV countries. 
However, public administrations and experts still usually address taxation reforms from a 
technical perspective, or, at best, assume that a virtuous circle should exist between 
taxation, representation and accountability. In numerous cases, this does not and cannot 
occur. 
 
2.1 Weaker state legitimacy 
 
State legitimacy is relatively weaker in conflict-affected countries than in non-conflict-affected 
countries, especially for countries facing high-intensity conflicts (Figure 1). More specifically, 
apart from three Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger),12 conflict-affected 
countries in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have a 
much lower level of state legitimacy (Figures 2 and 3).  
 
Figure 1 Conflict states vs. non-conflict states, (regional average, 2020) 
 




11  A number of features, such as the problem of a regressive tax system and poor bargaining power of tax administrations, 
is also common with low-income countries. However, the impact of the conflict dimension in most FCV countries implies 
some specificities in terms of taxation by armed groups or low state legitimacy. 
12  These three countries are also outliers in terms of revenue collection (Figure 1). 
13  See https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/p1/ for a definition of the State Legitimacy indicator. The indicator looks at 
the population’s level of confidence in state institutions and processes, and assesses the effects where that confidence 
is absent, manifested through mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, or the rise of armed 
insurgencies. Data comes from three main streams: pre-existing datasets, content analysis and qualitative expert 





Figure 2 SSA: High- vs. medium-intensity conflict states (2020) 
 
 
Source: Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace (see https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/p1/).  
 
Figure 3 MENA: High- vs. medium-intensity conflict states (2020) 
 
Source: Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace (see https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/p1/). 
 
This lack of confidence in national institutions and processes in FCV countries may have 
many different causes. These can include: the absence of state services in many parts of the 
territory, as well as corruption of civil servants (although this feature is not specific to FCV 
countries); behaviour of state security agencies that is sometimes violent or leads to 
racketeering of the local population; and overreliance on donors. 
 
Tax acceptance to (re)build a state does not necessarily appear to be relevant to many 
citizens in FCV countries. In many cases, citizens expect service delivery, which may not 
necessarily be provided by state actors. For example, national and international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), private companies or even armed groups can provide 
these services. In Somalia, some militias have exercised police activities in parts of the 
territory (Day 2020). Some militias in northern Mali have been institutionalised and have 
supported the actions of the army (Cantens and Raballand 2016). The presence of foreign 
armies and UN peacekeeping missions, as well as the large share of grants in the national 
budget and their visibility, globally impact the legitimacy of the state. Moreover, the project-






















































































the formal state apparatus, and one driven by donors (Blundo 2011). In this context, all non-
state processes and actors contribute to building the image of a state that may be the 
weakest public actor in some parts of the territory. 
 
2.2 The weight of colonial legacy  
 
The process of reconciling state-building and a modern taxation system faces two main 
colonial legacies that may be more important in reforms of FCV administrations than in other 
developing countries. 
 
The first colonial legacy is the relationship between state presence and profitability, 
particularly tax profitability. Contemporary deployment of the fiscal state over territory still 
follows a historical legacy: centralised taxation focusing on the profitability of the territory. 
Remote areas that were largely unoccupied by the state during colonial times remain the 
same today.  
 
For example, in Niger, colonisation first spread along the Niger river in regions that had 
abundant resources, as well as along the border with British colonies – to consolidate the 
French presence. Taxation in these borderlands was less coercive – so that people would 
not cross the borders and flee from territories under French rule (Lefebvre 2015). The 
profitability criteria of territories was also important when choosing where to deploy the state 
presence. The explanatory memoranda of colonial budgets expressed the constant concern 
of colonial administrators to collect as much as possible in revenue, as well as the ability to 
grow economically in areas they were administering.14  
 
The emergence of the fiscal state was not simultaneous in many colonies. The focus was on 
the coast – specifically, in the main ports and along the main transport corridors. From the 
beginning of the sparse French occupation in 1890, Niger remained a military territory, ruled 
by the colonial authorities in Dakar, Senegal, until 1922. Customs was created in 1937 in 
Niger, and in 1862 in Senegal. More generally, in French West African colonies the coastal 
countries benefited from customs administrations, whereas the hinterland countries were 
subject to military authority for a much longer time, with more limited revenue collection and 
less investment in tax collection. 
 
This was done at the expense of more remote regions, usually corresponding to some 
contemporary border regions – for instance in the Sahel, where terrorist groups have been 
growing and operating since 2010. Examples include northern Mali, northern Nigeria, 
northern Cameroon, and Darfur in Sudan. Armed groups emerged in those areas and still 
operate, resulting in a concentration of security incidents. In 2020 in Niger, for instance, more 
than half of incidents with armed groups took place within 20 kilometres of a border.15 The 
geographic evolution of armed groups and trade flows is not always predictable, making 
profitability difficult to calculate. As an example, in 2019 Nigeria closed its borders, forcing 
traffic with Niger to transit through the port of Lomé and then up to Niger by a route rarely 
used, causing an increase of more than 20 per cent in traffic to a few Niger customs offices 
bordering Burkina Faso16 – an area of operations for jihadist groups. 
 
The second historical legacy is the importance of power relationships or rapport de force in 
taxation. As a colonial legacy, many customs administrations in francophone Africa are 
comprised of armed uniformed officials. This confusion between collection of taxes and the 
 
14  e.g. see the Budget du Territoire militaire du Niger, from 1913 to 1920, and Andersson (2015). 
15  Computation by authors based on incidents recorded by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project 
(www.acleddata.com). 





use of force has historical roots. During colonial times, taxes paid by local populations were 
based on a power relationship. Traditional chiefs were mobilised as tax collectors. The first 
colonial customs officers were military auxiliaries. In Niger the tax was collected by 
meharistes (military patrolling on camels), who were permitted to levy in-kind taxes in 
nomadic camps, thus meeting their own food supply needs while on patrol. This proximity 
between the army and customs is still in force today, and is part of what Blundo and 
Glasman (2013) call ‘bureaucrats in uniform’. In many francophone sub-Saharan countries, 
customs are paramilitary: customs recruits have to go through a six-month training period in 
the army. In Togo, the customs headquarters building was adjacent to the army building until 
November 2020, despite the fact that customs had merged with the tax administration under 
the auspices of the revenue authority back in 2012.  
 
In the Sahel, in villages close to the borders, customs officials may be attacked or 
threatened. In 2006, smugglers poured gasoline on a customs officer in Maroua (Northern 
Cameroon), and threatened him with a matchstick. In 2007 in Kousseri (a region that has 
been under threat from Boko Haram since 2011), customs officers and their families were 
forced to hide in the military camp, because people burnt down their homes when a fuel 
trafficker died in a motorcycle accident during a customs chase. In Niger, the hostility of the 
villagers regularly turns violent when customs officials consider seizing or interrupting fuel 
trafficking with Nigeria.  
 
The effects of this perceived link between tax and military forces, and the trauma it caused 
for local policymakers in the post-colonial period, should be further examined, given the long-
lasting crisis for societies that were subjected to authoritarian social transformation through 
taxation. The fragility of states cannot be fully explained by the historical conditions of their 
emergence – but historical factors allow for a better understanding of the current situation, 
and should help to put the building of the fiscal state into a long-term perspective, linking the 
monopoly on taxation and unification of the country. 
  
2.3 Limits of state monopoly on taxation  
 
State legitimacy is ultimately weakened by taxation imposed by armed groups. In 
Afghanistan, the Taliban set up a ‘Stones Commission’ taxing mining (Dupée 2017), and 
would tax the export of drugs (Peters 2009). The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria implemented 
an effective taxation system on cross-border trade, and even issued paperwork to ensure 
traders were not taxed twice (Blannin 2017). In Somalia, Al-Shabab has been able to tax 
goods en route to or at the ports (Abshir et al. 2020; World Bank 2020). In Lake Chad, Boko 
Haram imposed taxes on traders and cattle owners (Cantens 2019). There are many other 
examples. In general, armed groups have higher coercion and enforcement powers – they 
may even have more predictable administrative processes than tax and customs services 
(Cantens 2019). 
 
Tax competition between state and non-state actors has important consequences for 
functioning at the local level. Local taxation is crucial for providing security in FCV countries, 
especially when only limited support is provided by national authorities. For instance, in the 
northern part of the Central African Republic, a head of the Customs Bureau dedicated a part 
of the revenue collected to pay for militia protection against armed groups. In Somalia, the 
government of Jubbaland needed customs revenue to pay security forces to ensure the 
security of Kismayo against armed groups.  
 
Customs and tax offices that are located outside the capital often have a certain autonomy in 
connection with the local representative of the state (Cantens 2012). For example, in Mali, 





the subject was raised in a meeting with the Director General of Customs in Bamako, the 
regional director, who was stationed in Gao, justified the withholding of revenue based on the 
lack of fuel, and the trade-off between the effort required to go to Timbuktu to obtain the 
revenue and the amount of revenue itself.  
 
This relative autonomy may lead to competition between customs offices within the same 
country to attract importers and meet revenue targets more quickly (Cantens 2012). In 
addition, in remote areas where there are few banking services local authorities must pay 
their providers in cash. Customs and tax revenue represent the only source of cash that can 
be easily accessed by local authorities whose national budget allocation payments are 
delayed or not transferred.  
  
2.4 Regressive tax systems: taxation of the poor, victims of the bargaining 
process 
 
Negotiating taxes entails a power relationship everywhere, including in rich countries. In 
many developing countries, tax and customs administrations often prefer to negotiate taxes 
rather than directly face fraud that they are unable to stop, due to lack of resources, difficulty 
in identifying potential taxpayers, accessing border zones, complexity in assessing the value 
of certain goods or the wealth of some large taxpayers, as well as occasional lack of political 
support. Thus, for instance, customs administrations prefer to agree with importers on 
minimum values for some revenue-generating goods or on some flows, like containers filled 
with miscellaneous goods from China (Cantens 2013). The threat of import strikes17 – the 
consequences of which are terrible for cash-strapped governments – allow business elites or 
highly organised groups to negotiate taxes either directly with revenue administrations or with 
governments.18  
 
The existing tax bargaining process has two consequences in FCV countries. The balance of 
power between the state and economic elites is largely to the detriment of the state, and in 
favour of the wealthiest economic actors.19  
 
Power asymmetry exists with a very high concentration of taxpayers. Taxation in Somalia 
and Niger is spatially and socially concentrated, in some cities and among a few dozen 
taxpayers. For instance, 20 traders account for 50 per cent of customs revenue in 
Mogadishu, and in 2020 in Niger 23 of the 2,772 importers accounted for more than 50 per 
cent of taxes and duties.20  
 
Taxation therefore becomes regressive, in the sense that, relatively, it is the poorest who 
bear the burden because their negotiating power is the weakest. In the 1980s and 1990s, the 
tax system reform – tax transition – was meant to lower tax pressure on trade and increase 
domestic revenue by implementing VAT, which impacts everybody with the same rate. 
Fjeldstadt et al. (2018) rightly note that more efficient tax systems can make the poor poorer 
if equity is not a priority in tax policy and administration.  
 
Taxing the informal sector, which includes small and medium enterprises (SMEs) or small 
and petty traders, is usually an explicit objective for policymakers and tax administrators 
 
17          Import strikes are a refusal to import goods to stop payment of taxes. 
18  In Togo in 2011, ‘Mama Benz,’ large informal traders, had threatened authorities with a strike on imports if flat taxes on 
their imports were not set at the level they had decided, which was very low compared to the value of goods. 
19  Even in non-fragile developing countries, large taxpayers benefit from special conditions during the tax negotiation 
process. The OECD even recommends negotiating with wealthy taxpayers because they have more diversified and 
complex assets (OECD 2009).  





when the taxation of other areas, such as real estate, is poorly developed or enforced. 
Implicitly, it is understood that the poor and informal sector should be potentially taxed 
because they represent millions of individuals with low bargaining power. Taxation of this 
sector could bring more revenue than focusing on wealthy taxpayers, who have more 
bargaining power. It may however lead to limited increased revenue at the end of the 
process, especially when tax administrators face widespread corruption, and the informal 
sector is tolerated with limited taxation. 
 
 
3  Improving state-building and taxation in 
FCV countries at the same time: under which 
political conditions? 
 
3.1 Revisiting the fiscal contract: taxing in the name of something rather than 
for something 
 
There are two main caveats when applying the security-versus-tax contract in FCV countries. 
First, policy recommendations often assume the existence of the fiscal state granted by 
people. However, societies can organise themselves separately and independently of 
national states and bureaucracies, especially at the local level. State avoidance and an 
informal economy do not necessarily lead to the disorganisation of societies (e.g. Ayadi et al. 
2013 on Tunisia). Moreover, anthropologists, like Pierre Clastres (1974) and James Scott 
(2009), have shown how societies can resist or avoid the emergence of monopolistic forms 
of power – including the state.  
 
Second, paying taxes and being provided with security raises a serious problem with 
timescale. On the one hand, large economic actors do not necessarily pay taxes but a 
‘tribute’ to the state. In all the interviews conducted with large traders, very few challenged 
the state’s legitimacy to tax them. For instance, a wealthy trader recognised that he had to 
pay taxes, but he calculated how much state revenue should be collected by assessing what 
the head of state needed for his travel and army.  
 
On the other hand, economic elites ensure their own security by contracting with local groups 
at a much lower price than their own contribution to the state.21 When interviewed on the 
need to pay taxes for security, an importer responded that he paid US$1 million in duties and 
taxes per year to the government, but only US$50 per month to a group of young people in 
his neighbourhood who keep his property safe.  
 
There cannot be a transaction between security as a service and taxes, because the 
construction of efficient state apparatuses – police, justice, education – is not on the 
timescale of the needs of individuals, and this difference is critical for people who live in FCV 
countries.  
 
We must not wait for the state to be legitimate for people to pay their taxes. It is the 
legitimacy of taxation, police or justice, that builds the legitimacy of the state. Where does 
 
21  e.g. see Cloutier et al. (forthcoming) for Somalia, where security is usually ensured by militia or clan-based security 
mechanisms. Similarly, in the Sahel, the recent development of communal militias is a non-state local response to 
provide security. Security is the first-sought priority for local populations, including and sometimes more for local elites 





this tax legitimacy come from? As Fjeldstad et al. (2018) say, ‘the overall challenge is not to 
tax more, but to tax better, i.e. more consistent, simple, transparent, fair, predictable, efficient 
and honest’. This policy recommendation is strong but still puts the processes (predictable, 
transparent, consistent, honest) and the politics (fair) on the same level.  
 
Taxation fairness is critical. Economic actors complain about corruption, regionalism/tribalism 
and patronage affecting implementation of the law among citizens and over the national 
territory. Governments may decide to implement less tax pressure in regions affected by 
rebellions to contain social discontent – for example, exempting former rebels from import 
taxes on cars they used for combat, to convert them into public transport. This kind of 
measure generates inequalities before the law and reinforces the diffuse feeling of collusion 
between authorities and parts of the elite. Equality is at the core of enforcement of the law, 
including tax law.  
 
Last and not least, bringing politics into taxation is to acknowledge that the administrative 
weakness of the state cannot be an argument against what has been decided as the fairest 
option. There is a problem when policies claim to (re)-build the state on the one hand, and, 
on the other, implement taxation options like VAT or duties on telecommunications only, 
because these taxes impact all citizens (Matheson and Petit 2017: 24) and are collected by 
the private sector.  
 
If the legitimacy of taxation is not at the core of the policymaking process we enter a non-
virtuous cycle leading to the emergence of a technical state, whose legitimacy rests only on 
the fact that it follows international or global technical standards that are sometimes 
supported by donor agencies. The ‘non-political mandate of donors’ is laudable and 
important and necessary, but it should not favour the emergence of ‘anti-politics machines’ 
locally (Ferguson 1990).  
 
3.2 Is local taxation a realistic part of the solution?  
 
The national state in FCV countries is usually weak, but this varies between national and 
local levels. Local elites (or citizens and traders) are usually more ready to pay taxes at the 
local level than at national level. In Somalia, for example, Abshir et al. (2020) and Van den 
Boogaard et al. (2021) demonstrate that willingness to pay taxes is lowest at the national 
level and highest at the local level (communities or cities). It was also shown that some cities 
(at the border with Ethiopia) collect several million US dollars per year when neither the 
federal member state nor the federal government are present at the border post (World Bank 
forthcoming). Moreover, local taxation offices may respond with strong mistrust of collection 
and transfers to the national single Treasury account. The Treasury is normally supposed to 
redistribute funding nationally. However, due to legitimacy problems, in most cases local 
elites (and even tax and customs officers) do not trust that any payment to the national level 
will fund services in their community. Thus, tax transfers to the capital fuel mistrust between 
the regions and the central state.22 
 
However, local taxation is not necessarily the solution for economic development either.  
 
First, it cannot be assumed that local taxation is always better in terms of accountability to 
the citizens and equity more generally. Indeed, less distance between tax collectors and 
taxpayers may also facilitate corruption and tax bargaining between elites. Furthermore, it 
could lead to low collection – and the same absence of redistribution to the poor.  
 






Second, taxation at the local level does not necessarily mean the existence of a strong social 
and fiscal contract. In Somalia, social pressure of the clan for the population to contribute is 
strong, and also exclusionary in terms of decision-making (Cloutier et al. forthcoming). Ali et 
al. (2020) demonstrate how British rule largely entrenched the power of chiefs and 
undermined their accountability to the local population.  
 
Third, one of the main state functions is to facilitate equalisation of resources from the richest 
parts of the country or society to the poorest segments or parts of the country. Increasing tax 
competition between towns or regions may increase inequality, or even lead to a country’s 
economic disintegration through a race to the bottom, with even lower revenue collection 
(World Bank 2020). Beramendi and Rogers (2021) demonstrate that divergence in sub-
national economies is related to predictable differences in the size of the fiscal state at the 
sub-national level. Therefore, without equalisation mechanisms, economic and social 
divergence is likely to be strengthened over time, which leads to pressure on social 
contracts.  
 
3.3 Customs revenue, a major source of revenue in FCV countries23 
 
The policy recommendations for developing countries presented in the first section are rather 
similar in FCV countries – for example, broadening the tax base. However, some tailored 
pragmatism has emerged recently. In the first instance, easy-to-collect taxes, such as 
customs revenue, is usually favoured.24 Based on its experience in FCV countries, the IMF 
clearly states that donors ‘should not underestimate the importance of customs’ (IMF 2017: 
43), and advocates for more assistance to be provided to customs administrations.25 
 
Indeed, the role of customs administrations in taxation is often blurred by two factors. First, 
there has been a major doctrinal shift, led by Western countries since 2001, to engage 
customs on border security within a global policy to combat terrorism, and, in some areas, to 
contain migration. In the meantime, the traditional customs role of policing goods has been 
focused on the fight against trafficking of prohibited or highly-taxed goods, like narcotics, 
weapons, counterfeit and excise goods (cigarettes and alcohol). Consequently, the revenue 
function of customs has progressively decreased in rich countries – while trade facilitation 
has remained a major constraint, guiding customs reforms in poor countries since 1994.  
 
The second factor usually blurring the customs role in taxation is purely formal. Official IMF 
and national budget statistics report national tax figures according to the categories of taxes, 
regardless of who collects them. However, in most developing countries, customs 
administrations collect trade-related taxes, sales taxes or value-added taxes (VAT) on 
imports, and even corporate taxes on exports or port fees in some cases. In FCV countries, 
revenue collected by customs usually accounts for more than 40 per cent of total tax revenue 
(see Annex 1).  
 
23  A major share of collected revenue does not necessarily mean that it contributes to the same level of a fiscal contract. 
Citizens are taxed indirectly through customs collection and increased consumer goods prices (including food products), 
and do not necessarily explicitly see their tax contribution. 
24  Cogneau et al. (2018) demonstrate that in the first part of the 20th century, a major increase in revenue in Africa was due 
to intensification of trade taxation: export tax rates roughly doubled between the 1920s and 1950s, while import tax rates 
nearly tripled in order to be able to expand expenditure. Andersson (2017), using historical data, explains that the 
prospects of key export commodities explain largely country-specific variation in colonial West Africa. 
25  Andersson (2016) shows the fiscal continuity with the colonial period and the importance of trade taxation. On one hand, 
colonial governments wanted to maximise the return on their investment in tax administration and to allocate scarce 
funds where they could enhance revenue. On the other hand, colonial authorities were subject to a range of 
constraining forces that limited their policy space, such as resistance from local populations, a weak economic base, 
challenging geographies and competing policy objectives. That is why they chose to tax trade, since that was easier 





Due to the standardisation of procedures by the WCO (the Revised Kyoto Convention), the 
international convention to classify goods (the Harmonised System), the enforcement of 
regional tariffs and some off-the-shelf clearance software, customs administrations in FCV 
countries can quickly start from scratch or re-build their procedures to be effective. However, 
are customs taxes fair?  
 
First, it is more difficult to evade customs taxes than internal ones – as the old customs 
adage says, ‘goods are the guarantee of taxes’. In this regard, within a context of fragility, 
customs taxation can be implemented more equally among economic actors than internal 
taxes.  
 
Second, the computation of customs taxes is relatively basic and uniform, and applies to the 
same tax base – the value or volume of goods. Governments can therefore apply tax 
pressure on goods according to their final consumers, deciding to tax some parts of the 
population more – increasing the transparency of taxation, and making political choices 
explicit. 
 
Third, traders form the major urban economic elite in FCV countries. Customs taxation is a 
way to tax them, and to control their enrichment and the development of social inequalities. 
Informal traders – those who are not the poorest or less organised actors – can also be taxed 
through customs: some countries decided to levy an import tax that is reimbursed when the 
trader pays a corporate tax. This is similar to the way the French introduced corporate tax 
during colonial rule – by first taxing the volume of trade. There is a major political advantage 
for governments in levying taxes through simple computation rules, to make the political aim 
of taxation transparent. 
 
These arguments are valuable if the state can control the re-allocation of customs taxes and 
excises in the final price of goods by the traders. Customs taxation is not exempted from the 
bargaining process described above. As negotiation is part of taxation, be it in OECD 
countries or in FCV countries, the fairness question should be the following. Should this 
negotiation be conducted within the existing asymmetrical relationship between the economic 
elite, and state officials who do not have any quantitative and transparent analysis – or 
should the role of state officials be to negotiate well, impose the public good as the major 
goal, and be monitored for that? The latter is probably the most wishful.  
 
 
4  Linking policy and technique: measures 
applied to customs  
 
Many of the measures undertaken to implement efficient customs policies in FCV countries 
have already demonstrated their effectiveness, including, for instance, the computerisation 
and standardisation of customs procedures, the measurement of customs performance that 
supports the fight against corruption, trade facilitation, and transparency on tax expenditure. 
Other changes contribute to reinforcing the legitimacy of the state, including for instance the 
progressive end of contracts with inspection companies to which governments delegated 
some key customs tasks, such as estimating value, controlling norms or scanning 
containers.26 This final section proposes to link the political and technical dimensions of 
 
26  See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/preship_e/preship_e.htm for more details. In 2013, Customs administrations of 
West and Central Africa region adopted the Niamey Declaration on provision of inspection services, where they 
stipulated a readiness to terminate this practice. The WCO supported them by developing Assistance to Members in the 





taxation applied to customs measures in FCV countries, and explore what contributes to their 
legitimacy. Annex 2 proposes the technical forms of such measures.  
 
4.1 Use data and develop data analytics to make taxation more transparent 
 
Data can be used for traditional customs objectives like analysing risk, fighting against fraud, 
measuring performance and predicting revenue. In FCV countries, the use of data by 
customs administrations is particularly critical to reduce the asymmetry of information 
between administration management and field officers, and also between customs and 
traders, to strengthen the bargaining power of the state with the private sector and 
consumers more broadly, assess value chains, and adjust taxation according to political 
objectives.  
 
When customs advocate to increase the tax burden on certain products to reduce pockets of 
fraud, they face objections that this would increase consumer prices. However, no analysis is 
conducted concerning the profits of importers and market structure of importing businesses. 
Customs administrations are usually blind when discussing tax pressure with economic 
actors — not because they lack data, but because they lack capacity in data analytics and 
data literacy. Likewise, data is needed to create the conditions for high-level negotiations 
between governments and the multinational corporations that represent significant 
contributors, usually with the support of governments of the countries of origin of these 
multinationals (Durst 2019), or to make more efficient assessment of reforms and revenue 
projections (Moore et al. 2015). Finally, the use of data, and especially sharing data within 
society, feeds public debate about tax equity (Mikuriya and Cantens 2020). This goes 
beyond the simple appeal to morality or citizenship.  
 
However, although customs administrations have been using automated systems since the 
1980s, including in many FCV countries, the data is usually not used within the 
administrations, and even less so outside administrations, with the occasional exception of 
donors.  
 
The power of data is not related to the level of development. There is no country that is poor 
in terms of data. There is, proportionally, as much data in FCV countries as in other 
countries. In FCV countries where customs have an IT clearance system, a customs 
declaration has around 60 fields of information, and around 300 if we include historical 
records of the actions on the declaration during its processing by customs. In countries 
where an IT system is nascent, customs still collect data through the declaration process,27 
which can be complemented with data collected by the private sector (like port operators, 
logistics and transport actors), and mirrors data of world exports to the country.  
 
4.2 Combine anti-fraud and anti-corruption efforts  
 
Corruption causes a major disruption in equality before the law. Scott (1969) shows how 
corruption is used as the cheapest way to achieve economic goals by social groups that do 
not access political decision-makers. In customs administrations corruption is systematically 
 
Guide-on-termination-of-inspection-contracts-FINAL-EN.pdf). Fewer and fewer governments conclude such agreements 
(see http://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/newsroom/2019/june/wco-participation-in-the-first-african-union-workshop-on-
pre-shipment-inspections.aspx). Delegating core functions can indeed increase collected revenue in the short term 
(Yang 2008). However, it does not contribute to state-building in the medium term, and the impact in the long-term is 
much more debatable. 
27  Even in countries impacted by civil war like Libya or Somalia, we observed local IT systems managed by customs. 
Where the customs information technology (IT) system was damaged or destroyed, like in Mali in 2012, its restoration 





associated with fraud, and it hinders reforms. It is cheaper and less risky to bribe customs 
officials than to by-pass them.   
 
The fights against fraud and corruption should, therefore, be implemented together, which 
does not happen most of the time. On the one hand, administrations create risk analysis 
units and train investigators; on the other, they adopt codes of ethics, simplify their 
regulations and deploy automation. Each of these actions is desirable, but they are seldom 
coordinated. 
 
In a Sahelian country, despite these measures being in place, a quantified analysis 
conducted by the authors found that more than 80 per cent of customs inspectors do not 
engage in any disputes during first-line controls. The fight against fraud brings in less than 
0.1 per cent of the revenue collected by the administration, and local officers identify 
corruption as the major factor explaining why there are so few fraud cases. 
 
Fighting against fraud is primarily a political objective, more than a revenue objective. It will 
not generate a lot of extra revenue in the short term, but will disrupt corruption chains and 
their negative impact on equality before the law among economic actors and the relationship 
between the state and the people. This is a paradigm shift from the one that usually prevails, 
and puts tax and customs administrations at the forefront of trade facilitation or business 
climate.  
 
4.3 Deploy customs in fragile borderlands to restore the presence of the state 
 
If taxing goods is easier for the state, it is also not difficult for armed groups. Borderlands and 
points of entry, where there are wealthy actors like traders on whom taxes can be levied, are 
privileged by armed groups.28 Another reason, that is technical, for them to stay in 
borderlands, is that they can escape the military and police forces by crossing the border, 
due to difficulties inherent in regional security cooperation and coordination of states across 
borders.  
 
The security responses to violent extremism and insurgencies are based on a military 
governance that contains and reduces movement and causes extra costs for traders 
(Cantens and Raballand 2017).  
 
Despite the fact that customs have a good field knowledge of the border economy, its social 
and geographical dimensions, they are rarely (not to say never) members of the country’s 
national security committee, bringing together defence and internal security forces. 
Cooperation is limited, locally, to customs officials seeking the support of police or military to 
catch smugglers.29 Where customs is absent, other state bodies can perform the customs 
function – usually the army, which occupies border posts and taxes traders (Cantens and 
Raballand 2017). This has a negative impact of the state turning into an armed group. The 
border economy is part of the political strategy of jihadist groups. However, state security 
policy does not include customs, and taxation and the border economy are not part of the 
security response to armed groups (Cantens 2019). 
 
Restoring the presence of customs in insecure borderlands is both desirable and feasible. In 
Niger borderlands, customs offices are connected to the capital and the IT system. This 
presence may appear as negligible compared to the presence of the military, but it is not. 
 
28  In Niger, since 2018, the median distance to the border of incidents involving jihadist groups is less than 20 km; in 
Burkina Faso it is less than 50 km, Nigeria less than 60 km and Chad less than 30 km (authors’ computation based on 
ACLED data).  





Due to their presence, customs collect data (and taxes) on trade flows crossing the borders, 
despite the presence of jihadist groups. As noted above, the surge of incidents in the Niger 
borderlands did not cause any decrease in trade flows across insecure areas. This 
observation can be transposed to almost all insecure areas treated in this paper: the violence 
of armed groups does not discourage traders. To mitigate the negative impacts of state 
security responses, there is a need to balance security and economy constraints and adapt 
security responses to the border economy. Unlike the military, customs are not perceived as 
a source of recurring violence in remote areas and can then ensure a positive presence of 
the state at borders, as they encourage and facilitate trade to attract revenue.30 
 
Customs are all paramilitary and armed. However, their capacity to patrol and operate in 
highly insecure areas is low, due to lack of training and heavy equipment. It is not desirable 
to turn customs into a pure security force. It is better for each state actor at the border to fulfill 
its mandate. As an example of fostering cooperation between customs and security forces, a 
regional ‘school of borders’ is emerging in the Sahel (supported by donors).31 Its rationale is 
to train customs and other security forces together, to reinforce the closeness between 
security forces and customs – all armed state actors operating in border areas. In this 
context, customs should be trained in security techniques to interact effectively and securely 
with the security forces. At the same time, the security forces should be trained to control 
cross-border flows of goods and people without blocking them. Training customs and other 
security forces together should be seen as an opportunity for security policies to be mitigated 
by economic constraints. 
 
4.4 Technical assistance on the ground 
 
Technical assistance is not specific to customs or FCV countries. However, due to our 
experience in FCV countries, we advocate for a specific reflection on this topic.  
 
Technical assistance is often provided remotely, bringing together experts and national 
officials in a third country or in the field. This is done on an intermittent basis for a limited 
number of sessions. The COVID-19 pandemic has strengthened the trend toward remote 
assistance, and it could become a permanent practice. In the IMF's assessment of its own 
activities in eight FCV countries, two countries in which field missions are prohibited 
(Afghanistan and Iraq) are those where officials complain the most about technical 
assistance (Takagi et al. 2018). Complaints include costly trips for national executives to a 
third country to meet IMF missions, a lack of knowledge of local realities, and inadequate 
assistance proposals. Conversely, in other countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina or 
Haiti, where the IMF continues to carry out field missions, the national officials interviewed 
expressed their satisfaction with technical assistance and requested it (Takagi et al. 2018). 
 
Field missions in fragile contexts are costly. However, in most cases, lack of security does 
not completely prevent access to the field. In Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, 
Iraq, Niger, northern Nigeria and Somalia, it was possible to organise advisory and training 
sessions in the border areas or at ports affected by insecurity (Cantens 2019). US Customs 
and Border Protection provided long-term technical assistance to Iraqi customs in the field 
from 2005 to 2011 (US Customs and Border Protection 2011). These examples, as well as 
 
30  In a Niger customs bureau, traders were happy with enclosures set up by the customs office - they could store their 
goods in them without fear of them being stolen. This simple feature, which should be with the customs bureau rather 
than military units, encouraged the regional development of the local city market. 
31  This project, to ‘implant the fiscal and economic software in the security forces’, which is led by customs administrations, 
has been initiated and carried out by one of the authors, with the WCO (WCO 2020). It is developed by the French and 
Niger customs administrations, the French cooperation and security forces, and is considered a shift in policy response 





those of the IMF, demonstrate that technical assistance on the ground remains possible in 
FCV countries. 
 
The benefits of providing technical assistance in the field rather than remotely are 
incommensurable. It is only by observing officials in action that experts can document and 
understand their constraints. You cannot understand how an administration works by reading 
its organisational chart and regulatory documents – especially with fragile states, where 
practices differ significantly from legislation and institutional frameworks. Sharing information 
about on-the-ground constraints and building relationships are even more crucial in FCV 
countries, where any change can expose officials to danger, including death threats. Thus, 
absence from the field undermines the legitimacy of experts. 
 
 
5  Concluding remarks 
 
The concept of the fiscal contract has limits in FCV countries. The tax base is too narrow for 
an effective tax bargaining process, and it is difficult to generate alliances between the 
government and some actors versus others. The economic elite has power to refuse or 
accept a tax measure. Some taxpayers are too large to completely avoid the state, but they 
do not expect much in exchange for taxation. At most, they can hope to push the state to 
adopt rules that would be unfavourable to their competitors. However, again, they expect 
nothing in return for the taxes they pay. They pay a tribute rather than a tax. There is no 
expected transaction or possible fiscal contract because the timeframes are fundamentally 
different – the building of efficient state institutions is not on the same timescale as the needs 
of individuals. What could be acceptable for individuals in a developing country at peace – 
contributing to the construction of the state through taxation, and accepting that its 
institutions are at a formative stage – is usually not acceptable in a fragile situation where 
people's lives are threatened.  
 
Moreover, due to legitimacy problems, taxation is focused on the least confrontational 
instruments – for example, targeting consumers and non-powerful actors by imposing 
income taxes on individuals. Therefore, they are usually regressive and contribute to an even 
lower level of tax acceptance. In fragile states, where state legitimacy is in the process of 
being established, there may be no virtuous cycle between paying taxes and building a state, 
as in developing countries in general. 
 
Any tax reform in an FCV country should take the political economy and power imbalances 
between tax collectors and the local population more into consideration. The gap between 
legislation and reality on the ground is usually very large. Deriving from this, reforms should 
be realistic: only very limited and gradual changes can be expected in the short-to-medium 
term, and any technical measure should be analysed through its political meaning.  
 
Moreover, tax compliance and morale are by-products of the legitimacy of the authorities, 
and the legitimacy of the authorities is a by-product of a tax policy that is perceived as 
legitimate by the people. A sudden increase in tax pressure is neither sustainable, nor 
desirable from a political economy perspective. In this regard, ‘how to tax’ is extremely 
important, and the fiscal state presence in border regions becomes even more critical for 
political reasons rather than pure revenue purposes. 
 
Taxes have a transformative power on societies. Thus, the presence of tax administrations is 
even more necessary in societies affected by conflict and threatened by terrorism. This idea 





leverage to improve governance and contribute to state-building, through, among other 
arguments, generating consent to pay taxes. In addition, one could advocate that more tax 
enforcement, as evidence of state effort to ensure equality before the law, coupled with more 
accountability vis-à-vis the citizenry, could have a developmental and transformative impact 







Annex 1 Share of tax revenue collected by customs 
 
Share of tax revenue collected by customs World Customs Organization Report 
Afghanistan 42.6% 2017-2018 
Bulgaria 45.4% 2018-2019 
Burkina Faso 40.9% 2019-2020 
Burundi 41.3% 2019-2020 
Cambodia 61% 2019-2020 
Côte d’Ivoire 45.6% 2019-2020 
Democratic Republic of Congo 30.9% 2019-2020 
Georgia 44.9% 2018-2019 
Guatemala 40% 2019-2020 
Guinea 69.5% 2019-2020 
Guinea Bissau 50.4% 2019-2020 
Kosovo 55.4% 2019-2020 
Kyrgyzstan 40.2% 2019-2020 
Liberia 41.8% 2019-2020 
Malawi 33.2% 2018-2019 
Mali 42% 2019-2020 
Moldova 56.5% 2018-2019 
Mongolia 33.3% 2018-2019 
Morocco 41% 2018-2019 
Nepal 48% 2018-2019 
North Macedonia 78.4% 2019-2020 
Pakistan 46.2% 2019-2020 
Palestine 73.8% 2019-2020 
Paraguay 47.7% 2019-2020 
Rwanda 31.1% 2018-2019 
Senegal 35% 2018-2019 
Serbia 51.6% 2019-2020 
Slovakia 42% 2018-2019 
Sri Lanka  45.3% 2019-2020 
Suriname 43% 2019-2020 
Tanzania 39.8% 2019-2020 
Togo 55.7% 2019-2020 
Uganda 41.4% 2019-2020 
Ukraine 37% 2019-2020 
Zambia 34.3% 2019-2020 







Annex 2 Fighting against fraud and corruption – some technical measures applied to 
customs 
 
Train officials in control 
techniques 
Training should focus concretely on control techniques, and not serve as a reminder 
about the basics of tax or customs laws, as is often the case. In all countries, there are 
national experts competent to train the younger generation of officers. Assistance 
should focus on investigation techniques. 
Ensure the existence of an 
incentive framework for controls, 
including effective 
implementation 
In most countries, the legal framework includes the payment of litigation bonuses, both 
individual and collective, to customs officials. 
Measure individual performance 
of officials performing control 
missions 
Experience has shown that some individual practices can quickly improve the situation, 
provided they are quantified and that indicators are shared internally and with the 
political authority and trade and transport stakeholders (Cantens et al. 2011; Chalendard 
et al. 2019). 
Create intelligence units and 
databases recording fraud cases 
Customs intelligence is often a particularly neglected area. Officers mainly rely on 
informants. This is usually effective, but insufficient because of a high dependence on 
individual relationships with informants, the risk of links between informants and 
officials, and the lack of consolidation of information. In many administrations, there is 
no database concerning disputes and seizures, as well as no operational intelligence 
unit. 
Develop techniques to detect 
customs clearance anomalies 
Differences in tax pressure among offices or in the application of regulations between 
administrative regions. Regarding customs, it is not uncommon to find differences in tax 
pressure depending on offices for identical goods imported from the same source 
countries by the same importers (Raballand et al. 2017). 
Develop a geographical 
approach in the fight against 
fraud 
In order to optimise the presence of the state - in particular customs posts and patrols in 
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